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澳洲為何想和中國開戰?

澳国防白皮书秘论与中国开战

2012年6月5日

(联合早报网讯)台湾旺报报道,曾是西方世界领袖中,唯一能操流利中文的前澳洲总理陆克文,在执政期间出版的国防白皮书(2009年),曾有未公诸于世的内容是关于如何与中国开战的细节,其中提到以潜舰阻断中国的贸易航道,但解放军会以长程导弹攻击澳洲港口来作为报复。

2007年,工党党魁陆克文击败执政长达16年的自由党/国家党保守联盟,取得执政权。陆克文曾到台湾师大学习中文,进入澳洲外交部后曾派驻北京,是澳洲的“中国通”,而陆克文政府主张加强对中关系。这次被踢爆曾有与中国开战的想法,令外界感到十分讶异。

最后没有写进内容


据澳洲新快网3日引述《澳洲人报》报导称,一本名为《王国与采石场:中国、澳洲、恐惧与贪婪》的新书,揭露澳洲2009年国防白皮书中,曾经设立“军力 2030”(Force 2030)目标,其中包括12艘配备导弹的大型传统动力潜舰、革命性的联合打击战机(JSF)、“空战破坏者”战舰,以及大型登陆舰等。报导指出,这些先进武器都是澳洲政府为了做好与最大交易伙伴──中国的开战准备。

据《澳洲人报》称,在2009年5月公布国防白皮书前,该报便曾报导澳洲安全情报局(ASIO)内幕,并就中国增加军费是否对澳洲构成威胁,引发媒体与政界的激烈争论。

然而,在最后定稿出版的白皮书中,尽管执笔人担心澳洲会与中国发生武装冲突,但还是没有将此内容写进。

大量购武承受压力

2009年出版的澳洲国防白皮书,名为《军力 2030:在亚太世纪中防卫澳洲》,全书共计18章、137页,其中第34页提到中国崛起的战略意涵,尤其是中国军力现代化因缺乏透明度,让周边国家感到担忧,因此中国必须与这些国家建立互信机制。

上述新书作者乌仁(David Uren)还揭露,为了购买大量新武器,澳洲财政部承受巨大压力,但是在公布的白皮书中,相关内容被删除。该书还称,国防部当时指出,澳洲需要做好与中国发生冲突的准备,但是情报单位认为中国并非扩张主义者,不太可能对澳洲构成威胁。

据报导,在没有公诸于世的章节中,主要内容着眼于澳洲与美国共同对中国进行海空联合作战能力,其计画是从远离中国的地方截断及控制其航线,并且停止向中国提供发展工业所需的自然资源。

而中国对澳方的报复是攻击港口。中国长程导弹距离达5000公里,可攻击澳洲本土,这意味着澳洲军方需有兼顾远距离及本土防卫的能力。
 最近的的民意調查顯示有68%的澳洲人認爲,如果日本因爲釣魚島爭執,
  在美國支持下跟中國開戰,澳洲應該拒絕加入。可是,我認爲(Dr Benjamin Herscovitch)
  澳洲不應該去除跟中國開戰的可能。

  Dr Benjamin Herscovitch - The Centre for Independent Studies 北京研究員

2015-01-13


Don’t rule out war with China
BENJAMIN HERSCOVITCHBusiness Spectator2:00AM January 13, 2015
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If the results of the recent poll commissioned by the Australia-China Relations Institute are a reliable guide, the majority of Australians share a ruthlessly pragmatic approach to foreign policy.

Australians are apparently so averse to upsetting all-important diplomatic and trade ties with China that 68 per cent of respondents said Canberra should turn down a US president’s request for assistance in a military conflict over the Japanese-controlled, but Chinese-claimed, Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Notwithstanding legitimate concerns about being dragged into North Asia’s volatile great power politics, Australia should leave open the option of going to war with China in the East China Sea.

Of course, as former foreign and defence ministers Bob Carr and David Johnston have emphasised, it would be reckless to pre-emptively commit to providing Australian military support to Japan and the United States in the event of an escalating clash between the Japanese and Chinese militaries over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Such a commitment would prompt an angry reaction from Beijing, and would raise further Chinese suspicions that the US-led network of Asian alliances is a tool to contain China’s international ambitions.

Moreover, pre-emptively pledging Australian military support would be premature.

The US-Japanese security treaty commits the United States and Japan to ‘act to meet the common danger’ of ‘an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan,’ including the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

By contrast, the security treaty between Australia and the United States only calls on Australia to act to defend the United States in the event that its territories, armed forces, public vessels or aircraft are attacked.

This means that although a Chinese assault on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands would prompt US action, it would only require an Australian response if the aggression also constituted an attack on the United States.

Given Australia’s deep diplomatic and political bonds with the United States and post-World War II record of consistently assenting to US requests for military support, there may be an overwhelming expectation in Washington that Canberra should join the fight. Nevertheless, the precise wording of the US-Australian security treaty would not require immediate Australian participation.

This, however, does not mean that Australia should rule out involvement in a US-supported Japanese war with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Beijing has a long track record of using border incursions, industrial sabotage, naval brinkmanship, and other aggressive tactics to advance its territorial claims in the East and South China seas and on the Indian subcontinent.

With the Chinese military expected to emerge as the world’s most powerful in the next few decades, and Beijing unlikely to give up its uncompromising stance towards its territorial claims, China’s already provocative tactics are likely to become increasingly aggressive.

In this context, an official Australian policy of neutrality in the East China Sea dispute would amount to a de facto assurance that Canberra will not stand in China’s way if it chooses to militarise the conflict.

This would not only alienate Australia’s numerous Asian friends and partners that are locked in tense territorial disputes with China, but would tacitly encourage Chinese territorial assertiveness.

Instead of playing into China’s revisionist goals with an official statement of neutrality, regional security and Australia’s national interest would be best served by a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity.’

Canberra should neither pre-commit to Australian participation in a US-supported Japanese military response to Chinese actions in the East China Sea, nor rule out going to war with China in the event of a request for assistance from Tokyo and Washington.

By taking a strategically ambiguous stance, Canberra would chasten Beijing’s territorial ambitions by leaving doubts in the mind of the Chinese leadership as to whether key regional powers like Australia will tolerate aggressive tactics.

Strategic ambiguity would also moderate a US-supported Japanese response by making it clear that an Australian military contribution is not assured.

Australians are understandably fearful of becoming entangled in Asia’s bitter territorial disputes, and yet a blanket refusal to take sides would simply benefit the most powerful and determined claimant state.

Canberra should therefore offer no assurances of neutrality and should leave open the option of joining a US-supported Japanese war with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

Dr Benjamin Herscovitch is a Beijing-based Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies.
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